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Abstract
This Essay is an experiment — a try-out — of an argument. The argument concerns what
I regard to be the most serious of the claims made by the critics, namely, the claims concerning
the relationship between the WTO and international trade law, on the one hand, and the Third
World, on the other hand. The claim is this: the WTO is anti-development, and international
trade law helps tilt the playing field on which the great game of trade is played against developing
countries. It is the “most serious” of the claims, I think, because the giant and still growing divide
between the First World and the Third World is the most important challenge facing the multilateral
trading system in these first few decades of the new millennium. Trade officials representing
the governments of nearly four or five billion people, and the critics that sympathize with them
who work in various United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and academic
institutions, seem to harbor doubts about the extent to which the system can accommodate the
development needs, or even promote sustainable, balanced growth.
MARXIST ORIGINS OF THE
"ANTI-THIRD WORLD" CLAIM
Raj Bhala*
"[T] he chief mark and element of insanity... is reason used
without root, reason in the void. The man who begins to
think without the proper first principles goes mad; he begins
to think at the wrong end."
-G.K. Chesterton'
1. FEELING LIKE CHESTERTON
A. It Cannot All Be True
It may come as a strange confession that as an international
trade law teacher, I empathize with one of my favorite writers,
G.K. Chesterton. Chesterton remarked that one of the reasons
he became a Christian was that Christianity was accused of every
vice, and the accusations sometimes were inconsistent.2 The crit-
ics of globalization treat the World Trade Organization
("WTO") the way many secularists approach Christianity. Rather
irrationally, both groups accuse their respective targets of nearly
every vice. If the critics are to be believed, there seems to be very
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portive and patient, and have provided me with one of the most valuable research op-
portunities a professor can have-to take risks and experiment with a "thought" piece,
without being hampered by traditional constraints (other than page length!). The op-
portunity is perfectly timed. I am working on a book tentatively entitled Trade, Growth,
and Justice for Foundation Press (forthcoming 2002). The ideas tested in this Essay are
likely to find their way into parts of the book. In this regard, I also would like to thank
my research assistants, Mr. Probir Mehta and Ms. TalomaJayasinghe, George Washing-
ton University Law School Class of 2001. They offered indispensable help in shaping
the arguments in this Essay, and for the book. And, they have been tenacious in track-
ing down relevant source materials.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Kara. As always, she supported this work. In
particular, her rich experience on Wall Street, coupled with her astute knowledge of
Marx's works, helped clarify many points about Marx's critique of capitalism.
1. C.K CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 27 (Image Books ed. 1990) (1908).
2. See id. at 84.
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little that the WTO and, by extension, international trade law are
not guilty of.
Chesterton had a clever response. Christianity could not
possibly be blamed for everything. It could not be guilty of be-
ing both too far to the East and too far to the West. It could not
be both too meek and too supportive of aggression. So it is with
the WTO and international trade law. Hurling every accusation
dilutes the force of the precious few that actually might have
something to them. Because they have failed to distinguish fact
from fiction, and because they have neglected the importance of
focusing on only the truly strong arguments, the critics have ren-
dered themselves vulnerable to a Chesterton-type response.
In Orthodoxy, Chesterton provides us with this defense of
Christianity, and with an evocative account of his own conver-
sion. I do not plan to launch a broad-based defense of the WTO
or international trade law in this short Essay. Nor do I anticipate
explaining the evolution of my perspectives on WTO-related is-
sues. I suspect the reader, if she agrees with nothing else in this
Essay, will agree with me on one point: Chesterton's spiritual
odyssey is far more interesting than my own intellectual one.
B. Trying Out An Argument
This Essay is an experiment-a try-out-of an argument.
The argument concerns what I regard to be the most serious of
the claims made by the critics, namely, the claims concerning
the relationship between the WTO and international trade law,
on the one hand, and the Third World, on the other hand. The
claim is this: the WTO is anti-development, and international
trade law helps tilt the playing field on which the great game of
trade is played against developing countries.3 It is the "most seri-
3. This charge is made-explicitly or implicitly-in a very large number of publica-
tions, far too numerous to cite here. A particularly strong version of it comes in
CHAKRAVARTHI RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION-GATT, THE URUGUAY ROUND & THE THIRD
WORLD (1990). Suffice it to say that the following recent books offer a rendition, in one
form or the other, and in differing degrees of clarity and intensity, about the negative
impact (actual or potential) of the WTO and international trade law on Third World
development. See JEREMY BRECHER & TIM COSTELLO, GLOBAL VILLAGE OR GLOBAL PIL-
LAGE-ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FROM THE BoTroM Up (2d ed. 1998); JOHN GRAY,
FALSE DAWN-THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998); GEORGE SOROS, THE CRISIS
OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1998); GRAHAM DUNKLEY, THE FREE TRADE ADVENTURE: THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND GLOBALISM-A CRITIQUE (1997); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD,
READY OR NOT-THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997); WORLD TRADE-To-
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ous" of the claims, I think, because the giant and still growing
divide between the First World and the Third World is the most
important challenge facing the multilateral trading system in
these first few decades of the new millennium. Trade officials
representing the governments of nearly four or five billion peo-
ple, and the critics that sympathize with them who work in vari-
ous United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), and academic institutions, seem to harbor doubts
about the extent to which the system can accommodate the de-
velopment needs, or even promote sustainable, balanced
growth.
Their perception matters. Even if it is a mis-perception, it
undermines their long-term fidelity to the system, and makes it
all the more likely they will seek revolution rather than reform.4
The minimal inference the claimants draw from the perception
that the WTO and international trade law are unfriendly to the
Third World is that more preferential treatment ought to be
given to the Third World. The preferences are known in the
jargon as "special and differential" (or "S & D") treatment.'
Some critics draw a more radical inference: the multilateral
trading system, as presently structured, is incapable of serving
the development interests of the Third World. It must be lev-
eled and re-constructed.
I do not intend to judge the truth or falsity of the claim in
this Essay. Frankly, its veracity is a critical issue on which my own
mind is not yet made up. I suspect the claim is correct with re-
spect to some WTO operations, and with respect to some areas
of international trade law, but that it is rather wildly off base in
WARD FAIR TRADE AND FREE TRADE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Jo Marie Griesgraber
& Bernhard G. Gunter eds., 1997); HANS-PETER MARTIN & HARALD SCHUMANN, THE
GLOBAL TRAP: GLOBALIZATION AND THE ASSAULT ON PROSPERITY AND DEMOCRACY (Pat-
rick Camiller trans., 1997); ARTHUR MAcEWAN, NEO-LIBERALISM OR DEMOCRACY? (1999);
DANi RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? (1997). I think the titles and sub-
titles speak for themselves.
4. It is difficult to counsel with a straight face that withdrawal from the multilateral
trading system-un-level as the playing field might be-is a wise policy choice. Thus, I
realize the majority of the critics tend to advocate not autarky, but rather major reforms
to the system by (for instance) far more generous S & D treatment for developing coun-
tries. However, it is not always clear where the dividing line is between a "major reform"
and a "revolution."
5. For a discussion of S & D treatment set forth in the Uruguay Round agreements,
see Alice Alexandra Kipel, Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, in
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 617-94 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
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other dimensions. But, for now, I am not opining on whether
the attacks against the WTO and international trade law, with
respect to Third World interests, are true or not. Instead, what I
seek to explore here are the intellectual origins of the claim.
My argument is this: the claim has its roots in Marxism, specifi-
cally, in Marx's critique of the international capitalist order. Yet, these
roots have been forgotten. I think these roots are important,
and should be exposed. Doing so might actually be in the inter-
ests of the claimants. If they want to avoid a smashing Chester-
ton-like rebuttal, they ought to make their charge more compel-
ling by displaying their intellectual heritage.
It is all too easy to read the term "Marxism" in a pejorative
sense. It is all too easy to think Marxism'is a bankrupt ideology
in light of the collapse of communism virtually everywhere. Just
as it is bad lawyering to underestimate the opposition, it is bad
scholarship to dismiss prematurely an entire paradigm. The op-
position may have a few good points; the paradigm still may yield
some provocative insights with enduring value. Besides, many
lawyers who have toiled away in multinational law firms for long
hours at highly specialized and repetitive tasks, not receiving the
full value of their labor input, and feeling alienated from clients,
might be surprised at just how many passages from the works of
Mr. Marx correctly capture their work life.
Thus, I am speaking about Marxism in an objective sense
(to the extent that is possible). I am saying that as a matter of
intellectual honesty, we ought to recognize the resemblance of
the claim to a grand critique that was offered well over a century
ago. I also must stress that I am not calling all critics of the WTO
and skeptics of international trade law "Marxists." Some may be,
whether they know it or not. But, I am not trying to mount an
argument about the proper appellation for these folks. My focus
is on the intellectual origins of the particular claim they make
concerning the relationship between trade and the Third World.
C. Another Confession
In addition to feeling as Chesterton must have, let me offer
another confession. I am not an expert in the writings of Karl
Marx. Studying some of his works, and some of the critiques of
them, does not make me one. If I do not yet feel ready to evalu-
ate, in a normative sense, the truth or falsity of the claim, then I
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should hardly feel equipped to offer a critical evaluation of these
works.
In other words, Marx is worthy of far more study than I have
yet devoted to him.6 I suspect that even after that study, I shall
feel myself to be a bit more advanced student than I am now-
but that will be all. In the meantime, I trust that the dwindling
number of Marx virtuosos will be kind in interpreting my com-
ments as limited to a small ration from the available feast of their
literature, and limited to the context of the charge against the
WTO and trade law. My comments hardly are intended to spoil
the feast.
Perhaps the most thorough way, to go about advancing my
two arguments, would be to dissect the works of Marx for
passages that relate quite obviously to the rhetoric of the critics
of the WTO and international trade law. For example, each of
the dimensions of the "anti-Third World" claim (e.g., concern-
ing agricultural goods, intellectual property rights, and so on)
could be mapped to a passage, and a neat summary table
presented. However, that time- and page-consuming methodol-
ogy is best left for another format. The methodology in this Es-
say is more impressionistic, raising the specter that at times the
discussion seem to be more a set of assertions than well-barri-
caded arguments. Again, I trust the reader will be forgiving.
II. THE IMPERFECT TRANSLATION FROM GROWTH THEORY
TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A. Some Conventional Wisdom
Is the multilateral trading system set up to ensure that trade
can, in fact, help facilitate the transformation of the economy of
a Third World country from one based on agriculture to one
based on industry? This question is premised on the models of
development constructed by great development economists, in
particular, the two-sector, labor-surplus growth models of Sir W.
6. I first encountered his works about 20 years ago, and have been an off-and-on-
again acquaintance of them since then. Most recently, I was delighted to find excellent
summary coverage of Marx's critique of capitalism and his views on imperialism and
trade in the leading development economics textbook, MALCOLM GILLIS ET AL., Eco-
NOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 30-34 (4th ed. 1996). For this Essay, I have relied extensively
on this source, as well as on several of Marx's own works.
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Arthur Lewis,7 John Fei, and Gustav Ranis.8 Their models teach
us that the story of Third World economic growth is not just (or
even largely) about international trade. Rather, growth is a story
about transformation from agriculture to industry. Interna-
tional trade can facilitate that transformation, if developing
countries have access to foreign markets for the products in
which they are beginning to specialize (e.g., low-value added
manufactured goods). In other words, their models put the role
of trade in Third World economic growth into a balanced per-
spective.
To critics of the WTO and international trade law, the an-
swer to the question is -obvious-"no." I doubt that most of the
critics think in terms of two-sector, labor-suiplus models. Thus, I
suspect they tend to exaggerate the role trade can play in
growth. It is a lot easier to excoriate the WTO and trade law if
you believe trade is the critical engine of growth for the Third
World than if you ascribe a handmaiden's role to trade in the
growth process. Re-balancing a horribly skewed playing field,
even tilting it in favor of the Third World, becomes indispensa-
ble to your ends. Accordingly, so goes the claim, market access
for industrial goods that LDCs are beginning to produce-the
very products that matter most to industrializing LDCs-is not as
generous as it ought to be. In other words, more generous S &
D treatment would allow trade to play a bigger role in facilitating
the agriculture-to-industry change. Or, why not re-think the sys-
tem entirely?
This claim sounds like an economic one. Indeed, several
development economists and policy analysts have sounded the
same note, namely, that developed countries ought to do more
to open their markets to Third World products. I agree, but I
think that at bottom, we can see the claim as involving the legal
process. Economists premise their discourses on their theories
of growth, coupled with the Ricardian principle of comparative
advantage. But, the fact is that lawyers write the trade rules. It is
lawyers, not economists, who control the keyboards, and thus get
to translate the insights from growth theory and comparative ad-
vantage into a regime of international trade rules.
7. See W. ARTHUR LEWlS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1955).
8. See GUSTAV RANIS & JOHN FEI, DEVELOPMENT OF THE LABOR SURPLUS ECONOMY
(1964).
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I suggest that this translation project-from development
economic theory into international trade law-never quite works
out. The translation always is imperfect. If the economic in-
sights were translated perfectly into trade law, then the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")-WTO texts, re-
gional trade agreements, and bilateral trade deals would be con-
siderably shorter than they are now. All they would need to say
is "all tariff and non-tariff barriers are hereby abolished." They
would need only a brief annex defining very broadly "tariff barri-
ers" and "non-tariff barriers." Then, items of particular impor-
tance to industrializing LDCs (low-and high-value added manu-
factured goods, for instance) would be assured duty-free access
throughout the developed world.
Why is the translation process imperfect? Why is our inter-
national trade law regime dreadfully large and nightmarishly
complex, and (in the eyes of the critics) hostile to the Third
World? Obviously, something happens in the translation process
that makes it so.
Conventional wisdom says that "something" is lobbying. In-
terest groups representing various causes-from legitimate
groups worried about threats to human health from genetically
modified organisms ("GMOs"), to protectionist bodies worried
about fair foreign competition-intervene just as economists
hand off the translation work to the lawyers drafting the rules.
The result is a message from economists laden with pressure
from interest groups. Indeed, there is an entirely separate body
of economic theory that explains the intervention-public
choice theory.
Thus, the conventional wisdom would suggest that if the
translation process-putting the economic logic of growth the-
ory and comparative advantage into trade law-were perfect,
then we would see far more generous S & D treatment than we
observe in fact. In terms of product coverage, it would be uni-
versal (or nearly so). In terms of political conditionality, there
would be none. The entire S & D program would be tailored to
facilitate the transformation from agriculture to industry of
which growth theory speaks, and to help Third World countries
realize comparative advantages. In brief, it would be designed to
make sure that the "trade variable" could do all it can (while
recognizing that more must be done by other variables) to stim-
ulate the growth process.
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In sum, the supposed paucity of S & D treatment for devel-
oped countries might result from old-fashioned protectionism in
developed countries, and that this result might be viewed as an
illustration of public choice theory. I would go so far as to say
this view is conventional wisdom, in that it is quite common in
Washington circles to explain away trade outcomes by throwing
one's hands up and saying with a resigned face "it's the lobby-
ists."
B. The Tendency to De-Radicalize
Observe that the conventional wisdom has a way of draining
radicalism from the answer to the question I framed at the out-
set. If the WTO and international trade law do not do enough
to assist Third World countries in their economic transformation
from agriculture to industry, then the reason has to do with lob-
bying pressures in the trade ministries and legislatures of devel-
oped countries. There is nothing inherently sinister about
global capitalism. There is no conspiracy among the power
elites of developed countries against developed countries.
Rather, it is all a matter of the way political institutions work in
the developed world. They tend to be nests of special interests,
and many of these interests operate against the transformation
aspirations of developing countries. If only these poor countries
had more lobbying clout in Washington, D.C., Brussels, Tokyo,
and Ottawa, then maybe they could cut themselves a better deal.
My point is that this approach to the "anti-Third World"
claim is patronizing. The conventional wisdom puts a grey pin-
stripe Brooks Brothers suit on Mr. Marx. It does not try to see
how and why he wears the clothes he regularly sports. That is, by
sweeping away the radical element, by throwing it in a dustbin,
the conventional wisdom does not take the "anti-Third World"
claim seriously enough. I think that when we de-radicalize the
claim, when we co-opt it into a respectable application of law
and economics (that being public choice theory), we lose track
of what it is all about. It is a bit like taking the angels out of the
artwork by Fra Angelico.9 Chesterton would not approve.
So, what I would like to put forth is another way of explain-
9. Fra Angelico's "The Coronation of the Virgin," which hangs in the Louvre Mu-
seum, is pictured in several art books, including CLAUDE MIGNOT, The Pocket Louvre 339
(2000).
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ing the oft-repeated criticism that S & D treatment is insufficient,
and that this insufficiency is a prime example of just how unfair
the WTO and international trade law are to the Third World.
The explanation is one whose origins date to the works of Karl
Marx. In fact, that is precisely my point. If we simply review
some of what Marx had to say, then perhaps we shall see that
there is a Marxist ring in the claim hurled against the WTO and
international trade law.
III. REVIEWING THE MARXIST MODEL
A. A Story of Inevitable and Merciless Exploitation
The Marxist origins of the "anti-Third World" claim can be
revealed by asking whether wealthy countries block-rather de-
liberately, I might add-economic growth in the Third World by
limiting access to their markets for Third World exports. Do the
wealthy countries talk like free traders, but at the negotiating
table behave like mercantilists, with the goal of maximizing mar-
ket access for their own multinational corporations ("MNCs")?
In the Marxist paradigm, the answers are a resolute "yes."
In 1867, Karl Marx published the first volume of Das Kapital.'°
Before then, he had written about various aspects of the nature
of capitalism in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.11
Between these two dates (sometimes co-authoring with Friedrich
Engels) he produced a large body of work in which he devel-
oped his critique. I find one of Marx's works that clearly and
concisely expresses his ideas is Wage Labor and Capital.12 This
Essay began as a series of lectures Marx delivered in Brussels in
December 1847, which were published in 1849.1"
10. See KARL MARX, Das Kapital, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 294-442
(Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. 1978). A very generous selection from Das Kapital is found
at pages 294-438 of what I think is the best single-volume compilation of Marx's works.
11. See KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Martin Mil-
ligan trans., Prometheus Books ed. 1988).
12. See KARL MARX, Wage Labor and Capital, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER,
supra note 10, at 203-17. In contrast, I find The Grundrisse very tough going indeed.
Excerpts from it are reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 10, at 221-93.
Professor Tucker's introductory note to The Grundrisse, in which he states it is a link
between the early works (like Wage Labor and Capital) and Das Kapital, and in which he
agrees that the text of The Grundrisse is raw, is very helpful. See THE MARX-ENGELS
READER, supra note 10, at 221.
13. See The Lives of Marx and Engels, in THE MARX-ENGEL READER, supra note 10, at
THE "ANTI-THIRD WORLD" CLAIM
As I confessed at the outset, I do not pretend to have mas-
tered all of Marx's works. But, the basic story line in Marx's clas-
sic critique of capitalism is clear enough: 4 competition among
capitalists ultimately will doom their economic system. The
chain of causation, said Marx, was inevitable-historically deter-
mined, as it were. For present purposes, I am not bothered
about the flaws-and inaccuracies of Marx's prediction. Rather, I
am concerned with his views of what happens amidst, and be-
cause of, capitalistic competition. Marx urged that in that pro-
cess, capitalists will exploit rather mercilessly not only workers in
their own countries, but also workers in poor countries, and in-
deed the poor countries themselves. Here, I think, lies the ori-
gin of the "anti-Third Woild" claim.
B. The Concept of "Surplus," and the Insatiable Appetite for
Nezw Markets
Marx's critique of capitalism posits two critical factors of
production: labor and capital. "Labor," of course, refers princi-
pally to workers on a factory assembly line. "Capital" means
physical capital, such as machine tools on an assembly line.
The model does not ascribe much importance to other fac-
tors, such as land or human capital. In the model, "capitalists"
are the class of businessmen who own the capital, and who em-
ploy labor to work with the capital in the production of goods.
The goal of capitalists-as free-market economists champion in
their classical and neo-classical models-is to maximize profits.
In the Marxist terminology, it is a relentless drive for "surplus
labor."'"
Occasionally, Marx is rather imprecise in some of his termi-
nology, and here we happen upon an example. As I intimated,
he speaks of "surplus," which at least in a loose sense we can
14. See THE MARx-ENGELS READER, supra note 10, at 1-443 (containing Marx's es-
sential writings on this critique). The Famous expression of this Marxian theory of
history is, of course, The Communist Manifesto. See KARL MARx, The Communist Manifesto,
reprinted in THE MARX-ENGE[S READER, supra note 10, at 469-500. The Grundrisse dis-
cusses the contradictions of capitalism that lead to its self-destruction. See MARX, The
Grundrisse, sec. C, End of Capitalism, reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELS READER, supra note
10, at 291-92.
15. See e.g., KARL MARx, The Grundrisse, sec. H The Dynamics of Capitalism, reprinted
in THE MARx-ENGLES READER, supra note 10, at 247-50.
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equate as conceptually the same thing as "profits" and "returns
to capital." How so?
Every capitalist has to pay his workers. Likewise, every capi-
talist has to invest money "up front" in a machine. The capitalist
wants to generate as much money over and above the wages he
must pay his workers, and over and above the previous invest-
ment expenditures in machines. In other words, every capitalist
is motivated to maximize "profit," in the sense of the amount of
money earned from selling products made by labor and capital,
less the amount he must pay to workers and for the machines.
Put squarely in the language of modern-day economic theory,
every capitalist wants to maximize profits, which is done by maxi-
mizing gross revenues from sales, and minimizing variable and
fixed costs of production.
However, capitalists do not have much control over sales
revenues. In the long run, they cannot generate higher returns
to capital by raising prices. So, said Marx, there is cut-throat
competition. (I understand one Marxist famously remarked that
when it comes time to hang capitalism, the capitalists will com-
pete to sell you the rope!) The.point is that in their competition
with one another, capitalists ineluctably over-produce. That is,
capitalists tend to saturate-and eventually super-saturate-the
markets in which they sell their goods. The inevitable result is a
decline in prices for those goods. 6
The way out of this spiral of over-production and price de-
clines is to expand the size of the market. But, the market in any
one country is only so large (particularly in the short- and me-
dium-term, and where population size is not growing rapidly).
So, capitalists seek 'to expand their markets by finding new ones
overseas. Here, then, is where capitalists become imperialists.
The more intense the competition in their domestic mar-
kets, the more voracious their appetite to find new consumers.
Indeed, they may unite on one point-entry into an unholy alli-
ance with their governments and military to force open foreign
markets. Of course, that unity breaks down when the military-
industrial complexes of the great powers fight among themselves
over the spoils from newly-opened foreign markets.
It is precisely on this point that V.I. Lenin expounds in his
16. See KARL MARx, Theories of Surplus Value, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER,
supra note 10, at 443-65.
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1916 classic, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.7
The building of railways seems to be a simple, natural, demo-
cratic, cultural and civilizing enterprise; that is what it is in
the opinion of bourgeois professors, who are paid to depict
capitalist slavery in bright colors, and in the opinion of petit-
bourgeois philistines. But as a matter of fact the capitalist
threads, which in thousands of different inter-crossings bind
these enterprises with private property in the means of pro-
duction in general, have converted this work of construction
into an instrument for oppressing a thousand million people
(in the colonies and semi-colonies), that is, more than half
the population of the globe, which inhabits the subject coun-
tries, as well a the wage slaves of capitalism in the lands of
"civilization." Private property based on the labor of the
small proprietor, free competition, democracy, i.e., all the
catchwords with which the capitalists and their press deceive
the workers and the peasants-are things of the past. Capital-
ism has grown into a world system of colonial oppression and
of the financial strangulation of the overwhelming majority of
the people of the world by a handful of "advanced" countries.
And this "booty" is shared between two or three powerful
world marauders armed to the teeth (America, Great Britain,
Japan), who involve the whole world in their war [the First
World War] over the sharing of their booty.18
With just a few changes in words-for example, from "building
of railways" to "forging of international trade routes"-it is easy
(though, again, perhaps not correct in a normative sense) to
translate Lenin's classic into a modern-day critique of the WTO
and international trade law.
This "bourgeois professor" earns his keep partly by explain-
ing the purported virtues of WTO membership for countries like
China-a natural progression in China's economic develop-
ment, a reinforcement of its nascent democratizing trends
through the enforcement of GATT Article X transparency obli-
gations, and the continued movement to a more civilized rule of
law culture.19 But, in Marxist-Leninist terms, what the accession
17. See V.I. LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STATE OF CAPITALISM (Junius Publica-
tions Ltd. ed. 1996).
18. Id. at 4-5 (preface to the French and German editions).
19. See generally Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon, 15 AM. UNIV. INT'L L. REV. 1469 (2000)
(discussing China's odyssey with respect to the GATT-WTO membership, the proposed
terms of such membership, and the benefits and risks of membership).
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to the WTO of new Members from the Third World is all about
is market access. Market access for whom? Not so much for
China and other developing countries, Marx would reply, as for
the hegemonic trade powers that already are in the club. China
is a case in point. Even the President of the United States could
not help but admit that the 15 November 1999 bilateral conces-
sion agreement between the United States and China was the
most lopsided trade deal in history. 20 American MNCs won
nearly everything; domestic producers gave very little.
C. The Source of Surplus-Accumulated Labor
There remains a small conceptual leap fro'm the concept of
surplus and the need to open up markets overseas on the one
hand, and Lenin's conclusion quoted above, on the other hand.
The bridge between the two sides is' Marx's proposition that the
capitalists' "surplus" is formed from accumulated labor.21
In the Marxian paradigm, capitalists might not have much
control over the cost of capital. They have to buy machines for
the factory assembly lines at whatever price prevails, and eventu-
ally they must recoup that investment if they are to avoid insol-
vency. Thus, says Marx, the essential source of surplus (i.e., prof-
its) is labor. Specifically, he means that a capitalist's profit really
is a surplus generated by accumulated labor. But, what does this
proposition mean?
To maximize profit, the capitalist minimizes the one varia-
ble over which he has some control-wages. The capitalist pro-
duces 'more and more, and endeavors to raise the productivity of
capital, through greater division of labor.22 Laborers work on
ever-more narrow, and thus ever-less satisfying, tasks. They use
machinery that enables them to produce more in a given period
20. See id. at 1530.
21. See KARL MARX, Wage Labor and Capital, reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELS READER,
supra note 10, at 207-10 (discussing this proposition). -'
22. See id. at 211-17 (discussing the division of labor and its effects on wage rates).
See also KARL MARX, The Grundrisse, sec. ,G Capitalism, Machinery and Automation, reprinted
in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, supra-note 10, .at 278-90 (discussing fixed capital and the
increasing automation of labor); KARL MARX, Das Kapital, chs. XIV Division of Labor and
Manufacture and XV Machinery and Modern Industry, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER, supra note 10, at 388-417 (discussing the division of labor in the manufacturing
process and in society); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 50-54,
60 (1845) (Prometheus Books ed. 1998) (discussing the division of labor and its conse-
quences, including, ultimately, revolution).
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of time, so the scale of production expands (hence the conse-
quences of over-production and price depression that I men-
tioned above). As the workers' tasks are divided, they are by def-
inition simplified.
Marx argued that as workers compete with one another for
employment that is monotonous, wage rates in this repulsively
unskilled labor market inevitably fall. The capitalist is only too
eager to pay workers only a subsistence wage, or as near thereto
as possible. That way, the "return on capital" 23-another way of
describing "surplus" or "profit"-is larger. Here we see a rather
direct connection to a critical dimension of the "anti-Third
World" claim: neither the WTO nor international trade law
does enough to protect the rights of workers in developing
countries.
I said that Marx argued the source of surplus is "accumu-
lated" labor. What does the adjective "accumulated" mean? It
refers to Marx's famous labor theory of value, 24 which the follow-
ing example illustrates. Suppose a worker at IBM requires 10
hours to produce a personal computer ("PC"). IBM sells the
computer for US$2,000, a price that reflects ruthless competi-
tion in the PC market among a number of producers-IBM,
Dell, Gateway, etc. Is the worker paid US$2,000 (or anywhere
near that amount)?
Of course not, urged Marx. Marx says that IBM will pay a
wage that is the minimum amount necessary for the worker to
survive-a subsistence wage. Suppose that amount is US$100. It
ought to be quite apparent why Marx sneered that "[t]o be a
productive laborer is, therefore, not a piece of luck, but a misfor-
tune. ' 25
So far, this analysis is all quite familiar to students of classi-
cal and neo-classical economics. The caveat to add is that Marx
.. 23. 1 should point out that the meaning of expression "return on capital" (or "re-
turn to capital") in the Marxian paradigm is a bit different from that in the modern-day
capitalist sense. Whereas Marx was rather imprecise in this terminology, the Wall Street
analyst would consider it the to be the rate of return that an owner of a machine earns
from the funds he invested to buy that machine. In other words, it refers to the return
on invested capital, which is a narrower concept than "profits."
24. See KARL MARx, Das Capital, reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELS READER, supra note
10, at 307-19 (discussing use value, exchange value, and the labor time necessary for the
production of a commodity). Marx discusses how labor surplus is created. Id. at 344-
61. Marx also discusses the greed of capitalists for surplus labor. Id. at 364-67.
25. Id. at 418.
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assumed there is a large pool of labor-a reserve army of the
unemployed-that ensures (along with the division of labor)
that wage rates are kept lOW. 2 6 As soon as workers lobby for a
wage increase, they will be met with the rebuttal from capitalists
that there are many outside the factory gates willing to take their
jobs. The machinery the capitalists employ in the production
process is their ally: it dispenses with the need for muscular
power, thereby expanding the pool of eligible workers to include
weaker men, plus women and children.
27
To be sure, there might be an excess demand for workers,
based on labor shortages. Marx would reply that such a situation
would not endure, that sooner or later, the capitalist business
cycle would turn. The tendency ofc apitalists to over-produce
when in competition with one another might lead them, at some
point, to cut back temporarily on production. In turn, they
would lay off workers, and the redundant workers would staff the
reserve army of the unemployed.
At this point, Marx's argument takes a U-turn. He re-visits
the production process, and posits that the PC (in my example)
embodies 10 hours of labor. That is, the value of the PC is based
on the 10 hours of labor. Yes, that value also reflects other fac-
tors of production-capital and land, for example. But, Marx
dwells on the labor input, hence the name for his theory of the
valuation of goods-the labor theory of value. Moreover, the
surplus (i.e., profit) of capitalists is derived from the deliberate
failure of the capitalists to return to the worker all 10 hours of
value that are embodied in the PC. In the example, the worker
toiled for 10 hours, but received only $100. For Marx, that $100
is not anywhere near the full labor value embodied in the prod-
uct. It might translate into, say, 4 hours worth of work, assuming
a subsistence wage of $25 per hour. In other words, the capital-
ist obtained a surplus from the worker of 6 hours.
Here, then, is the explanation for the statement that the
surplus generated by capitalists is "accumulated" labor. For
every PC IBM sells, it accumulates 6 hours of labor in the sense
that it does not return this portion of the value of the product to
26. See id. at 426-28 (linking wage rate movements with the expansion and contrac-
tion of the industrial reserve army).
27. See id. at 404 (discussing the employment of women and children, as well as the
lengthening of the work day and the intensification of labor).
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the worker who made it. The repeated phenomenon of paying
workers less than the labor value embodied in their work is accu-
mulated surplus. As Marx wrote in Das Kapital,
The value of a commodity is, in itself, of no interest to the
capitalist. What alone interests him, is the surplus-value that
dwells in it, and is realizable by sale.... The shortening of the
working-day is, therefore, by no means what is aimed at, in
capitalist production, when labor is economized by increasing
its productiveness. It is only the shortening of the labor-time,
necessary for the production of a definite quantity of com-
modities, that is aimed at. The fact that the workman, when
the productiveness of his labor has been increased, produces,
say 10 times as many commodities as before, and thus spends
one-tenth as much labor-time on each, by no means prevents
him from continuing to work 12 hours as before, nor from
producing in those 12 hours 1,200 articles instead of 120.
Nay, more, his working-day may be prolonged at the same
time, so as to make him produce, say 1,400 articles in 14
hours. ... The object of all development of the productive-
ness of labor, within the limits of capitalist production, is to
shorten that part of the working-day, during which the work-
man must labor for his own benefit, and by that very shorten-
ing, to lengthen the other part of the day, during which he is
at liberty to work gratis for the capitalist .... The directing
motive, the end and aim of capitalist production, is to extract
the greatest possible amount of surplus-value, and conse-
quently to exploit labor-power to the greatest possible ex-
tent.2
8
It is this fact, urged Marx, that makes capitalism inherently ex-
ploitative, and the conditions under which it occurs alienate the
worker from the fruits of his labor. Simply changing a few words
in the above-quoted package would suffice to make it appear to
be a contemporary attack on global production and trade, the
evils of which are felt by Workers in poor countries, yet which are
effectively protected in good measure (so the claim goes) by the
WTO and its rules.
Marx took the point one step further, saying that capital it-
self is accumulated surplus.29 His point was that capitalists may
re-invest the accumulated surplus generated by the difference
28. Id. at 383-85.
29. See id. at 420 (stating that "[t]he correlation between accumulation of capital
and rate of wages is nothing else than the correlation between the unpaid labor trans-
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between the labor value of a product (in the above example, ten
hours), on the one hand, and the return to labor (in the above
example, four hours), on the other hand. Specifically, they re-
invest in physical capital, buying more machines and building
more assembly lines. In fact, capitalists need to re-invest the sur-
plus in order to expand production, and thereby become larger
and stronger in their competition with one another.30 Hence,
for Marx, the source of not only profit, but also of capital, is
accumulated surplus from labor.
IV. IMPERIALISM AND TRADE
A. The First Link: Access to New M'rkets
What does the Marxist argument have to do with trade in
the modern-day multilateral trading system, and how is it the
starting point for the now-fashiQnable proposition that devel-
oped countries block full and fair participation in this system?
31
First, as I intimated in Part III, in. their never-ending efforts to
maximize surplus in the face of intense competition in ex-
hausted domestic markets, capitalists inevitably look for new
markets overseas. Marx makes this: point in various works, in-
cluding The German Ideology:
With the advent of manufacture the various nations entered
into competitive relations, a commercial struggle, which was
fought out in wars, protective duties and prohibitions,
whereas earlier the nations, insofar as they were connected at
all, had carried on an inoffensive exchange with each other.
Trade had from now on a political significance.... In spite of
these protective measures large-scale industry universalized
competition .... established means of communication and
the modern world market, [and] subordinated trade to it-
self.... By universal competition it forced all individuals to
strain their energy to the utmost. It destroyed as far as possi-
formed into capital, and the additional paid labor necessary for the setting in motion of
this additional capital").
30. See MARx, supra note 11, at 41-52 (concerning the accumulation of capital and
competition among capitalists).
31. One obvious answer to this question, which I am not pursuing here for reasons
of space, is the whole school of thought known as "dependency theory." For an excel-
lent series of Essays on the strengths and, weaknesses of this theory, see DEPENDENCY
THEORY-A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT (Dudley Seers ed., 1981). Likewise, for the present,
I am not delving into systems theory, but the reader may wish to refer to IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN, THE ESSENTIAL WALLERSTEIN (2000).
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ble ideology, religion, morality, etc., and, where it could not
do this, made them into a palpable lie. It produced world
history for the first time, insofar as it made all civilized na-
tions and every individual member of them dependent for
the satisfaction of their wants on the whole world, thus de-
stroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate na-
tions.3 2
It seems quite apparent that Mr. Marx was commenting on
globalization and its pernicious effects long before the critics of
the WTO and international trade law.
In the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries, the search for
new markets led to overt colonialism. The expression "trade fol-
lowed the flag" meant that a colonial power could open up new
trading markets by sending in its navy first. In fact, Lawrence
James' examination of colonial history suggests that the opposite
actually occurred in many instances-the flag followed trade in
order to secure and reinforce trade routes that merchants had
pioneered. I might also remind us that even Marx suggested
the possibility of a few salutary effects, however unintended they
may have been, of British colonialism in India, namely, the de-
struction of the age-old and oppressive village system that was
the foundation of Oriental despotism.34 But, these debates are
for another time and place.
In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, it is not uncom-
mon to hear it said that MNCs from developed countries are the
new agents of colonialism,'and international trade law is written
to serve MNC interests. 35 Critics point out that the bargaining
power to open up new markets is asymmetric. That is, except
where the developing country is large and powerful-Brazil,
China, Mexico, or India, for instance-MNCs (or their govern-
ment representatives, such as the United States Trade Represen-
tative) are largely able to dictate terms of market access.36
32. KARL MARx, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY, supra note 22, at 77, 81.
33. See LAWRENCE JAMES, RAJ-THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF BRITISH INDIA
(1997). (Okay, I do like the title, but I also like the sub-title.)
34. See KARL MARx, The British Rule in India, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER,
supra note 10, at 653-58.
35. See, e.g., the books cited supra note 3.
36. I must remark on the passion with which this point is put in my classes by
students from developing countries who come to the George Washington University
Law School after serving in senior negotiating posts with ministries of their respective
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B. The Second Link: Extracting Surplus
The second link (also intimated in Part II) between the
Marxist argument and the proposition that the multilateral trad-
ing system is an un-level playing field takes us back to the con-
cept of labor surplus. As capitalists open up new markets over-
seas, they also locate production facilities overseas, particularly
in colonies or former colonies ("foreign direct investment"
("FDI"), in modern parlance). After all, why not make goods in
these Third World countries, where labor costs are relatively
lower than in the home countries of the MNCs, thereby minimiz-
ing returns to labor and maximizing profits? In so doing, capi-
talists extract surplus from Third World laborers-a colonial, or
neo-colonial, surplus.
This extractive process, Marx argued, is inherently exploita-
tive. Developing countries need the surplus to re-invest in their
own economies (e.g., in new production facilities). Precisely be-
cause they are poor countries, they lack a large endowment of
resources to use as a basis for industrialization. Draining what
surplus they do have from their workers makes their growth pro-
cess all the more difficult.
Unfortunately for the poor countries, the principal source
of investment comes from abroad-FDI. This investment gener-
ates accumulated surpluses that MNCs repatriate to the bank ac-
counts of the capitalists that run them from plush offices in de-
veloped countries. Contemporary critics of the multilateral
trading system would add simply that WTO rules-such as the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade Related Investment Mea-
sures ("TRIMs") -actually protect this exploitative process.
C. The Third Link: Hypocritical Trade Policies Advocated by an
Unholy Alliance
There is still another dimension to the relationship between
the Marxist paradigm and .the "anti-Third World" claim leveled
governments. Surely these class interventions are not all stories woven from their imagi-
nations.
37. From time to time, workers in the home countries of the own multinational
corporations tire of their exploitation, and threaten industrial action. Then, the capi-
talists can take some of the labor surplus extracted from developing countries, and use
it to increase the wages of the restless workers. Of course, the increase would be the
minimum amount necessary to stave off the threatened action. See GILLIS ET AL., supra
note 6, at 30-31.
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at the WTO and international trade law. The critics claim that
during the present period of neo-colonialism, as in the colonial
era of the past, capitalists advocate free trade policies vis-A-vis de-
veloping countries. They push for open markets overseas as an
outlet, or vent, for their excess production. Simultaneously, they
lobby their governments for protection from foreign imports, so
as to avoid exacerbating competitive pressures in domestic mar-
kets. Here is a double standard that amounts not to pure free
trade, but rather mercantilism in new garments.
Worse yet, there seems to be nothing in the logic of capital-
ism to put an end to the hypocrisy. Marx and his adherents, as I
have suggested, observed that the declining rates of return to
capital in developed country markets, caused by over-production
and ferocious competition, coupled with the prospect of cheap
labor overseas, mandate a push to pry open Third World mar-
kets. Yet, independent of this mandate is another: natural re-
sources. Some Third World countries have minerals and other
raw materials necessary to fuel the engines of capitalist produc-
tion.
Accordingly, so goes the Marxist critique, capitalists push to
secure these sources of supply for their factories. For the Third
World country, the result is over-investment in its natural re-
source sector.38 Rather than focus on giving birth to, and nur-
turing, infant industries, the country is "encouraged" by MNCs
and their governments to pursue a free trade policy that allows
foreigners to invest in this sector, and assures them of a steady
source of supply from it. Depending on the geographic location
of, and political structure in, a particular Third World country, it
may be impossible to safeguard these sources and trade routes
without military help. Hence, now as in the avowedly colonial
era of the past, an unholy military-industrial alliance is estab-
lished.
A particularly intriguing feature of this alliance was identi-
fied by a formerly famous development economist of the mid-
20th Century-Paul Baran. (I confess great disappointment at
the lack of attention given today to his work.) In his 1957 classic,
The Political Economy of Growth, Baran inquired why workers in
developed countries generally had declined to unite with their
cohorts in developing countries, and to protest against the ex-
38. See GILLS ET AL., supra note 6, at 33.
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ploitation of the military-industrial complex. Baran's argu-
ment was that developed country workers tended to benefit from
the alliance.39
Suppose the supply of natural resources from developed
countries were restricted or cut off, and re-directed to infant in-
dustries in the Third World. Would the developed country
workers be better off? Hardly, said Baran. They would lose their
jobs, because absent this supply of natural resources, which were
essential inputs in the goods they made, their factories would
have no option but to close down. The most obvious example of
the clash of interests was between workers in defense industries
in developed countries, on the one hand, and workers in emerg-
ing industries in the Third World, on the other hand. It was no
small clash, given the economic importance and political promi-
nence of defense and defense-related industries in developed
countries. I I
In sum, the third link is this: very nearly dictating free trade
policies to developing countries, while limiting the access of de-
veloping countries to developed country markets, hampered the
integration of developing countries into the multilateral trading
system. They could, not grow to become robust players, because
the playing field was not level. They could not protect their in-
fant industries. Their agricultural and industrial sectors re-
mained exposed to stiff foreign competition in their own domes-
tic markets, and they had few overseas opportunities themselves.
Indeed, small producers and local industries-from handicrafts
to textiles-were destroyed.
Worse yet, goes the Marxist-influenced argument, in some
developing countries the power elite-rulers and their families,
the land-owning aristocracy, and well-connected businessmen-
connive with foreign powers against the interests of the poor.
This elite class enjoyed the luxury items made by foreign MNCs
and exported to developing countries. Cars and washing ma-
chines are examples. Members of the elite class also were quite
happy to see the MNCs produce luxury goods locally, which they
could afford.
Thus, wrote the renowned Brazilian development econo-
mist, Celso Furtado, serious income inequality within a Third
39. See PAUL BARAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (1957); see also the dis-
cussion of Baran's argument on this point in GILLIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 32.
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World country can, and does, lead to an alignment of interests
between local elites and foreign capitalists.4 ° Why would these
elites advocate a more level playing field for multilateral trade, if
that would entail (1) limiting luxury good imports (in order to
preserve precious foreign exchange reserves for imports essen-
tial to the poor, or to emerging industries), (2) a re-orientation
of domestic production away from luxury goods consumed by
local elites and toward basic goods in which there was a broader
societal interest, and (3) maybe even formal income redistribu-
tion?
Conversely, why would foreign capitalists seek radical
change, when (1) they profit from exporting luxury items to the
power elite in developing countries,, and (2) their own home
markets are spilling over with excess production? To the con-
trary, the local power elite and foreign capitalists have every in-
centive to keep the trade regime just the way it is.
Not surprisingly, therefore, after winning independence
from their forme r colonial masters,. and particularly after the
Second World War when a number of development theories
arose that condoned one form or another of protectionism to
assist in the growth. process, many Third World countries turned
inward. China's and India's socialist policies (different in nature
and severity, to be sure), and much of Latin America's import
substitution policies, are examples. Some theories were rather
pessimistic about the possibility of ever achieving a level playing
field within a capitalist paradigm. They called for a restructur-
ing of economic and social relationships, along non-capitalist
lines," and these calls found outlets in various United Nations
declarations.42
V. THE ROMANCE OF ORTHODOXY
In an indirect way, Chesterton's chapter title-"The Ro-
40. See Celso Furtado, "The Brazilian Model" of Development, in THE POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 324-33 (Charles K. Wilber ed., 1979).
41. Such theories are discussed in Keith Griffin & John Gurley, Radical Analyses of
Imperialism, the Third World, and the Transition to Socialism, 23J. ECON. LIT. 1090 (1985).
42. See, e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Special) U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559; Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 3171,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Resolution on
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1963).
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mance of Orthodoxy"43 -captures the argument I have sketched
above. Chesterton meant that, for him, orthodox Christian
teaching was far more fulfilling-more comforting in an emo-
tional sense, and more persuasive in an intellectual sense-than
all the alternatives he considered. I do not mean to suggest I
find Marxism "romantic," though just a few decades ago it most
definitely was to a very large number of influential minds around
the world. Rather, my point is that the critics of the WTO and
international trade law, and in particular those practitioners and
scholars who say the multilateral trading system and its rules are
adverse to the interests of the Third World, are attracted more
romantically to Marx's orthodox critique of capitalism than
many of them either realize or admit.
Specifically, I have argued that the origins of their "anti-
Third World" claim lie in some of Marx's works. Orthodoxy, i.e.
Marxist teaching about the nature of capitalism and its conse-
quences for imperialism and trade, is the root (or, at least, one
of the important roots) of their claim. The critics who profess
very great concern about the relationship of the Third World to
the multilateral trading system stand in a line that leads-with
twists and turns, and through many scholars, novelists, poets,
and artists-back to Marx's critique.
Labor exploitation, class conflict, rapacious competition
among global competition that injures the poor, conspiracies
among elites, dominance of politics (including those of the
WTO) by hegemonic developed countries-all these are ele-
ments in the "anti-Third World" claim. Yet, these are precisely
the elements out of which Marx constructed his critique in the
mid-1800s. While this origin has been obscured (perhaps delib-
erately so in the post-Cold War era), it is neither obscure nor
insubstantial. In my view, however flawed it was as a prediction,
and however insanely evil it was when put into practice during
the 1900s, the critique remains a uniquely potent condemnation
of capitalism and its attendant phenomena such as international
trade.
The "anti-Third World" claim is a passionate one. But, as in
any romance, the greater the passion, the harder it becomes to
pull back for a moment and reflect on the basis for the passion.
Is not passion inherently irreducible and inscrutable? Chester-
43. See CHESTERTON, supra note 2, at ch. VIII.
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ton's Orthodoxy answers this question. He is quite candid and
self-critical in his introspection concerning a matter far less sus-
ceptible to rational discourse than international trade law and
policy. I think the "anti-Third World" claimants can learn a les-
son from Chesterton. In fact, for three reasons, I think they had
better do so if they want to advance their cause more effectively.
First, it is a lot easier to respect a claim if the claimant is
open about her philosophical underpinnings, particularly if
these underpinnings are reasoned. I know I am in for a far
greater intellectual struggle if I am up against a critic of the
WTO who grounds her charge in the strongest parts of Marx's
works than if I am debating a critic who has no idea why he takes
the positions he does. What are those parts of Marx's works with
the greatest endurance, despite the dreadful experience with
communism in practice? I think they are Marx's critique of capi-
talism that I outlined in Parts III and V. What difference does
being open about this root make? It is the difference between
talking with a mature, committed intellectual in the lobby of a
law school library at 11 p.m. versus a dilettante at a Student Bar
Association party who is looking for a marketable cause around
which to organize a fund-raiser next week.
To be sure, I may not agree with the Marxist critique, but do
you see how a critic of the WTO and international trade law who
does agree with it shifts the grounds of the debate? I am no
longer obligated merely to defend as sufficiently generous the
phase in periods for developing countries in the TRIMs Agree-
ment, or the special rules on red light subsidies for least devel-
oped countries in the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures, or some other technicality of S & D treatment.
Now, I am forced to defend the whole of trade law. I am forced
to explain why the WTO and its rules are not instruments for the
hegemonic trading partners. The debate has become a far more
ambitious one, and it will spill over from the law school library
lobby to the late-night coffee house.
Second, the "anti-Third World" claim is more than just pas-
sionate. It is a potentially devastating charge against the pre-emi-
nent trade-liberalizing institution and the mountain of law on
which it sits. Revealing the full genealogy of the claim leads us
to a revelation: the international trade world is bitterly divided.
If the origins of the claim really do lie in some of the writings of
Marx, then we could not say so easily there is one paradigm for
20001
156 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:132
analyzing the WTO and international trade law that embraces a
few different perspectives. We could look askance at a
Fukuyama-inspired argument 44 that there is a consensus around
the world in favor of liberal democracy and market capitalism,
and that the only real debates are quibbles about the specifics of
the democratic institutions or the extent of intervention in the
marketplace to direct outcomes. Rather, we would have to stare
uncomfortably at the reality of a radically different paradigm
motivating practitioners and scholars, one that impels them to
work towards outcomes that may be incompatible with those we
seek.
Here again, the debate becomes a far more ambitious one.
It will not do for me to yell and scream about the inhumanity of
Stalin's Russia or Mao's China, because we are not talking about
communism in practice. The intelligent critic will stipulate to
that sordid history, and insist that the matter at issue is the effect
of international trade in the capitalistic GATT-WTO paradigm
on the Third World. Confronted with the "anti-Third World"
claim rigorously grounded in Marx's more potent criticisms of
capitalist development, I shall be forced to re-read Marx, his in-
tellectual heirs, and his detractors. I shall be forced to attack the
very paradigm of the critics.
To do so, I shall have to know more than just all the
strengths and weaknesses, all the sharp points and the excesses,
of that paradigm. In addition, I shall have to deal with a bevy of
statistics, and countless heart-rending anecdotes, about the large
and growing divide between the First World and the Third
World, and even within particular Third World countries. I shall
have to explain why post-Cold War capitalism in general, and
specifically trade liberalization through the GATT-WTO system,
are not the reasons for the divide. I shall have to marshal statis-
tics about the direct relationship between (1) maintaining an
economy open to international trade and (2) growth in per cap-
ita gross national product. Otherwise, I cannot mount a success-
ful counter-claim for reform rather than revolution. I believe I
can do so, but notice how much more difficult my burden of
proof has become.
44. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992)
(arguing that there is a coherent, directional progression of history leading most of
humanity to liberal democracy).
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The first two reasons for exposing the genealogy of the
"anti-Third World" claim are teleological. The first reason is
about intellectual respect for a counter-paradigm. The second
reason is about highlighting the very existence of the counter-
paradigm. Both reasons lead to a common end, namely, shifting
the debate to a more ambitious level on which the "anti-Third
World" claimant is no longer a muddle-headed gadfly moved by
politically liberal rhetoric. She is a serious thinker with a ra-
tional devotion to a view of the world that seems to find support
in the data about poor countries she examines, and on the
streets and in the villages of the poor countries to which she trav-
els. Her perspective puts me to the test.
I think there is one more reason to plumb the heritage of
her "anti-Third World" claim. But, this reason is not teleologi-
cal. Rather, it is an end in itself: intellectual honesty. Surely
Chesterton would approve of that.
